Justification internalism, self knowledge, and mental content externalism by Ross, Amber
JUSTIFICATION INTERNALISM, SELF KNOWLEDGE,  









A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of 
Philosophy. 
 















                                                                                                 Approved by: 
 
Advisor: Ram Neta 
 
                                                                                                           Reader: Marc Lange 
 
                                                                                                          Reader: John Roberts 
ABSTRACT 
 
Amber Ross:  Justification Internalism, Self Knowledge, and Mental Content Externalism 
(Under the direction of Ram Neta) 
 
 
    At first blush, mental content externalism and justification internalism seem incompatible.  
If some of the content of my mental states supervenes on factors external to me, the content 
of these mental states might be unavailable to me.  If the factors relevant to the justification 
of my beliefs are the relations between the contents of my beliefs, and I do not have access to 
these contents, then these beliefs cannot be justified internally.   
    I propose to reconcile mental content externalism with justification internalism by taking 
the factors relevant to the justification of a belief to be the relations between how one would 
express one’s beliefs, not between the contents of those beliefs.  Though mental content 
externalism may somewhat restrict an agent’s self knowledge, it could not restrict an agent 
from knowing how he would express his beliefs, and therefore would not hinder his access to 
the relevant justificatory factors.            
 ii 
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I  Introduction 
 
 
    Justification internalism is the view that all the factors relevant to the justification of a 
belief are in some sense internal to the agent and available to her.  Mental content 
externalism is the view that the content of certain types of intentional mental states is in part 
determined by factors outside the agent. There has been expansive debate over whether 
justification internalism is a satisfactory theory of justification, or instead if some factors 
external to the agent, and not necessarily accessible to her, determine whether a belief is 
justified.  More recently, there has been a related debate concerning whether mental content 
externalism, a theory that enjoys broad acceptance in philosophy of mind, poses a special 
problem to justification internalism.  The problem would be this:  If some of the content of 
my thoughts supervenes on factors external to me, this aspect of my thought might be 
unavailable to me.  Mental content externalism would thereby place restrictions on my self 
knowledge.  The justification internalist maintains that the factors relevant to the justification 
of my beliefs are factors to which I have first-personal access, factors that I can know from 
my first-person perspective.  If the factors relevant to the justification of my belief are the 
relations between the contents of my thoughts to which I do not have access, my beliefs 
could not be justified internally.          
 In this paper, I will attempt to provide an account of self-knowledge, as restricted by 
mental content externalism, that would put the factors relevant to justification within the 
agent’s first person perspective and would thereby be accessible to the agent.  If my account 
is accurate, then we will have found a way in which justification internalism and mental 
content externalism would be compatible, even if we accept all the limitations mental content 
externalism might place on self-knowledge.  In doing so I will discuss forms of justification 
internalism characterized by Conee and Feldman and by BonJour, the account of mental 
content externalism given by Putnam and Burge, the debate between Boghossian and Burge 
on self knowledge, and James Chase’s reply to BonJour’s speculation that mental content 












 As epistemic agents, our first desire may be that we hold only, or at least mostly, true 
beliefs both about ourselves and about the world around us and we would prefer not to hold 
these true beliefs merely by luck.  We also want to rightly feel confident that our beliefs are 
mostly true, confident that the way in which we form our beliefs will continue to be 
trustworthy.  We hope that we form our beliefs rationally and that we refrain from believing 
things that we have no good reason to believe.  So long as I am rational in forming my beliefs 
and hold them for good reasons, I will be satisfied that my beliefs are justified and as 
confident as I can be that I am rational, whether or not my beliefs are true.  These are at least 
some of our desiderata as epistemic agents.     
 Justification internalism is the view that an agent’s beliefs are justified if that agent has 
good reasons, internal to the agent herself and (according to most internalist positions) to 
which she has access, for holding the beliefs that she does.  Of course, there are a variety of 
internalist positions, but one element they share in common is that they all seem to use 
“justification” in a way that fits with our pre-theoretical intuitions regarding what it means 
for our beliefs to be justified.  An agent’s belief is justified if that agent had no way of 
knowing (or no reasonable way of becoming aware of the fact) that this belief was false or 
 
based on dubious reasoning.  Justification internalism is attractive because it puts all the 
factors required for judging oneself to be a reasonable epistemic agent within one’s.  It 
allows the agent to be fully responsible for the justification of her beliefs. 
 If we adopt justification internalism, justified beliefs will fit the desiderata outlined above.  
On this view, for my belief to be justified I must have been rational in forming my belief and 
hold it for good reasons, reasons that are accessible to me from my current first-person 
perspective.  Thus I will be satisfied that I hold the beliefs I ought to hold and as confident as 
I can be that I am rational, even though the actual truth or falsity of my beliefs is a matter 
outside my control.       
 
 
Mental Content Externalism 
 
 Mental content externalism is the view that the content of certain types of intentional 
mental states is in part determined by an agent’s relationship with the environment, and 
therefore does not supervene on physical properties within that agent.  This theory of mental 
content was motivated by semantic content externalism, the view that the meaning and 
reference of some kinds of terms is determined in part by factors external to the agent.  The 
most widely recognized arguments for semantic externalism, as well as mental content 
externalism, are Putnam’s “Twin Earth” thought experiments. 
 Twin Earth is a planet on which there is an odorless, tasteless liquid that fill the rivers and 
oceans, expand when frozen, etc., which is superficially identical to water on earth.  Also on 
Twin Earth, there is a community that speaks English, and they call this liquid ‘water’.  
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However, the chemical composition of twin water (the water on Twin Earth) is XYZ.  Aside 
from their chemical composition, properties of twin water and water are identical, and we 
might add that every other aspect of Twin Earth is identical to Earth as well.  
 Putnam argues that when Twin Earthlings use the word ‘water’, they refer to the liquid in 
their environment that goes by this name, XYZ.  When Earthlings use the word ‘water’ they 
refer to the nearly identical liquid in their environment, H2O.  Therefore, following Putnam, 
we would judge that “On Twin Earth the word ‘water’ means XYZ” (1975, p585), and we 
would also judge that “On Earth the word ‘water’ means H2O”.   
 To explain the difference between the meaning of ‘water’ on Earth and ‘water’ on Twin 
Earth we need to look not to the internal states of the English and Twin English speakers, but 
to the environments in which each are immersed.  What determines that ‘water’ means H2O 
on earth instead of meaning XYZ is that the earth environment contains H2O, not XYZ.  The 
meaning of ‘water’ on Earth, therefore, is partially determined by the environment of the 
English speakers, partially determined by the actual extension of the term.  And, of course, 
the same holds for the meaning of ‘water’ on Twin Earth.     
 It is a short leap from semantic externalism to mental content externalism.  When a Twin 
English speaker entertains the proposition expressed by the sentence “There is a glass of 
water on the table,” mental content externalists contend that he thinks a different thought 
than an English speaker whose thought would be expressed as “There is a glass of water on 
the table”.  Putnam claims that even if English speakers and Twin English speakers have not 
yet discovered the chemical composition of water and twin water, and are in the same 
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psychological state1, they understand the term ‘water’ differently (1975, p585), and therefore 
the content of their mental states would not be identical. 
 In “Individualism and the Mental”, Tyler Burge introduces a thought experiment similar to 
Putnam’s Twin Earth involving a patient’s understanding of the condition of arthritis and the 
social environments in which the patient might be immersed.  As with Putnam, Burge 
concludes that due to differences in the linguistic community in the actual and counterfactual 
situations he describes, the agent’s mental content involving the term ‘arthritis’ will be 
different in the different contexts, even though “the patient’s internal qualitative experiences, 
his physiological states and events, his behaviorally described stimuli and responses… 
remain constant, while his attitude contents differ”. (1979, p601) 
 In Burge’s thought experiment, an agent S has a certain set of beliefs about arthritis that are 
based on “casual conversation or reading, and never hearing anything to prejudice him for or 
against applying [the term “’arthritis’] in the way that he does” (1979, p600).  In particular, S 
correctly believes truly that he has arthritis in his joints, that he has had this condition for 
many years, etc.  He also “thinks falsely that he has developed arthritis in the thigh” (1979, 
p600).   
 The reason that his belief is false, of course, is that the experts in his linguistic community 
delineated a set of medical conditions that are the extension of the term ‘arthritis’, and no 
condition of the thigh is a member of the set.  That is, given the correct usage of ‘arthritis’ in 
his social environment, arthritis cannot be a condition of the thigh.   
 In a counterfactual linguistic community, ‘arthritis’ is taken to apply to all the conditions 
that it encompasses in the actual linguistic community, plus conditions of the thigh.  Call the 
                                                 
1 Assuming that we take “psychological state” here to supervene on properties internal to the agent, which is 
standard but not necessarily completely uncontrovertial. 
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agent in the counterfactual situation S*.  S* would assent to all the same propositions that he 
would in the actual situation, and in the counterfactual situation his belief that he has arthritis 
in the thigh is correct.  The question before us, then, is whether the content of S’s mental 
states in the context of the actual social environment is the same as the content of S*’s 
mental states in the counterfactual environment.   
 Burge concludes, of course, that the content of S’s and S*’s mental states are not identical.    
    The word “arthritis” [in the counterfactual case] does not mean arthritis.  It does not 
apply only to inflammations of the joints.  We suppose that no other word in the 
patient’s repertoire means arthritis.  “Arthritis”, in the counterfactual situation, differs 
both in dictionary definition and in extension from “arthritis” as we use it…. However 
we describe the patient’s attitudes in the counterfactual situation, it will not be with a 
term or phrase extensionally equivalent with “arthritis.”  So the patient’s 
counterfactual-attitude contents differ from his actual ones. (1979, p600-601) 
 
 If we take extension to be a constituent of the meaning of a term, then we will concur with 
Burge here that the meaning of S*’s term ‘arthritis’ differs from the meaning of S’s term 
‘arthritis’ (in later works the content of S*’s thought is called ‘tharthritis’).  We arrive, then, 
at Burge’s conclusion, that the differences in the extension of the terms “spell differences in 
[the agents’] mental states” (1979, p601).  When the content of an agent’s mental states 
involve wide-content concepts, that content is constituted not only by states internal to the 
agent (since we assume that S’s and S*’s internal states are identical), but also by facts in the 
agent’s environment.  Since concepts like arthritis are “widely individuated”, there will be 
elements of the meanings of these concepts that are beyond the reach of an agent’s first-
person perspective.  This will limit the agent’s self knowledge, and the extent to which it is 
limited will be investigated in detail later.  But here we can begin to see how mental content 
externalism puts some of the content of an agent’s thought outside of the scope of an agent’s 







III  The Conflict 
 
 
 Now that we have laid out the views that seem to be in conflict, we can examine precisely 
where the tension is between them and whether the conflict can be avoided.  The apparent 
problem, once again, is this:  If some mental content is wide, then some of the content of an 
agent’s belief may not be internal to that agent.  It seems to follow that some of the factors 
relevant to the justification of that agent’s belief may not be appropriately internal to the 
agent in the way that justification internalism claims that they are.   
 
 
The Compatibility of Mentalism and Mental Content Externalism 
 
 There are several varieties of justification internalism, and Conee and Feldman (2001) 
divide them into two categories, mentalist and accessibilist.  What makes a view mentalist is 
that it requires that the factors relevant to the justification of a belief be internal to the mind 
of the agent.  As Conee and Feldman write, Mentalism is  “the view that a person’s beliefs 
are justified only by things that are internal to the person’s mental life” (2001, p233).  This 
view does not specify precisely how something’s being internal to an agent’s mental life does 
the work of justifying their beliefs; it specifies only that the factors relevant for the 
justification of an agent’s belief are internal to that agent’s mental states.       
 
Conee and Feldman’s Mentalism is committed to two theses; “S” and “M” .   
    S- The justificatory status of a person’s doxastic attitudes strongly supervenes on 
the person’s occurrent and dispositional mental states, events, and conditions. 
    M- If any two individuals are exactly alike mentally, then they are alike 
justificationally, e.g., the same beliefs are justified for them to the same extent.  (2001, 
p234)   
 
 Conee and Feldman take Mentalism to reflect the distinction between externalism and 
internalism found in philosophy of mind and ethics as well as epistemology, and they seem 
to sense a conflict between Mentalism and mental content externalism: 
    What internalism in epistemology and philosophy of mind have in common is that 
being in some condition which is of philosophical interest- being epistemically 
justified in certain attitudes, or having certain attitudes with certain contents- is settled 
by what goes on inside cognitive beings. (2001, p233)   
 
 The association that Conee and Feldman draw between epistemological internalism and 
internalism in philosophy of mind shows that Conee and Feldman intend their use of 
‘mental’ in S and M to be interpreted as including only narrow mental content, the content 
shared by denizens of Earth and Twin Earth who have thoughts they would express as, “This 
is water”.  “[A theory of justification] is internalism if and only if contingent factors external 
to the mind cannot make an epistemic difference” (2001, p234).  According to this 
interpretation, we would take two agents who are “exactly alike mentally” to have precisely 
the same psychological content and/or physical constitution, but possibly inhabit two 
significantly dissimilar environments.  We would also take the “mental states, events, and 
conditions” on which justification supervenes to be the narrow content of mental states, 
physical events internal to the agent, and the agent’s psychological conditions.     
 This is certainly what Conee and Feldman had in mind when they proposed Mentalism as a 
form of epistemological internalism, but it does not follow from this that Mentalism, as its 
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theses S and M are stated, actually conflicts with mental content externalism.  And on a more 
liberal reading of these two theses, we might interpret them in such a way that they could 
easily incorporate mental content externalism.  We would take “mental” to include both 
narrow and wide content, as a mental content externalism views mental content.  We could 
then hold both S and M without being committed to the view that mental states are 
individuated by conditions internal to an agent.   
 If we admit that some mental content is wide, we might hold both that the justification of 
an agent’s beliefs strongly supervenes on that agent’s mental states, and that the content of 
those mental states is sometimes determined by the agent’s environment.  If we take the 
“mental” in “mental content externalism” to be referring to the entire content of an agent’s 
mental states, then the factors relevant to the justification of an agent’s beliefs could be found 
in both the wide and narrow content of that agent’s mental states.  If we read “mental” in this 
way, there would be no conflict between Mentalism and mental content externalism. 
 We may become concerned that on this interpretation, one in which we take mental content 
externalism to be compatible with Mentalism, there will be no difference remaining between 
Mentalism and epistemological externalism; mental content externalism claims that external 
factors may partially determine the content of mental states, and justification externalism 
holds that some of the factors relevant to the justification of a belief are external to the agent.  
Mentalism’s status as an internalist theory of justification looks questionable if we allow 
some of the content of an agent’s mental state to be external to the agent, but perhaps this is 
merely a way of bringing attention to a general problem for Mentalism.   
 It seems as though the reason we value that the factors relevant to the justification of an 
agent’s beliefs are internal to the agent’s first-person perspective is that those factors would 
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thereby be accessible to the agent.  Mentalism never guaranteed that our reasons would be 
accessible to us, but merely that we stand in a certain sort of relation to those reasons; not 
one of access, but a certain sort of ownership or internal possession.  These reasons are our 
reasons because they are our mental states.  Of course, we admit that many of our own 
mental states are not available to us- unconscious desires, for instance.  If we really are 
interested in the desiderata laid out at the beginning of the paper, and this is our motivation 
for adopting an internalist theory of justification, then it seems that Mentalism will not be a 
satisfactory theory of justification, whether or not we take into account mental content 
externalism.  We would not necessarily be able to determine, from our first-person 
perspective, that we are rational in forming our beliefs, or feel confident that our beliefs are 
true.  Much more would need to be said to argue that Mentalism really is an unsatisfactory 
internalist theory in and of itself, and though I think there is reason to be suspicious of it and 
intend to investigate this matter thoroughly in future work, this matter is slightly beyond the 
scope of this paper.         
 In any case, it not does seem that Mentalism guarantees that we will have access to the 
factors that justify our beliefs, since Conee and Feldman specifically distinguish Mentalism 
from other internalist theories that emphasize our access to these factors.  To save our 
original desiderata, in particular our desire to feel confident that the beliefs we hold are 
justified and know that we are rational in holding the beliefs that we do, we will need to 
examine whether mental content externalism is compatible with a stronger form of 
internalism, what Conee and Feldman call “Accessibilism”.  In order to do this, we will need 
to determine the extent to which we have access to our own thoughts, if some of the content 







IV Self Knowledge 
 
 
Introducing Mental Content Externalism and its Problem for Self Knowledge 
 
 The concern that justification internalism is incompatible with mental content externalism 
is related to, and perhaps arises from, a similar concern in the literature regarding self-
knowledge and wide mental content.  Paul Boghossian puts the point this way: 
    Intuitively, the difficulty [that arises for self-knowledge in the face of mental content 
externalism] seems clear: how could anyone be in a position to know his thoughts 
merely by observing them, if facts about their content are determined by their relational 
properties? (1989, p11) 
 
 In “Content and Self-Knowledge”, Boghossian argues that if we accept mental content 
externalism we cannot “know our own minds” (1989, p5).  We take ourselves to know the 
content of our minds directly, Boghossian claims, without inference from anything such as 
our behavior or our other beliefs.  There are two possible grounds for our self-knowledge: we 
either know what we think on the basis of introspection, or on no basis whatsoever.  But if 
the content of our mental states is determined by factors beyond our own psychological or 
physical states, factors such as our physical or social environment, Boghossian claims one of 
two things follows.   
 1) If we believe that a faculty such as introspection gives us access to the content of our 
minds, this faculty will not tell us the relation that we stand in to the external world, and so 
 
cannot reveal to us the content of our thoughts since that content is determined by such a 
relation.  
 2) If we adopt the position that we know the content of our mental states, but on no basis 
whatsoever, we encounter difficulties describing how it is that we know our own thoughts.  
(1989, p5)       
 This clearly could develop into a problem for justification internalism, since the view is 
that the factors which play a role in justification are the relations between an agent’s beliefs 
or mental states, relations to which the agent has first-personal access.   
 
 
Mental Content Externalism and Introspection 
 
 How does mental content externalism undermine introspection as an authoritative source of 
knowledge of our thoughts?  Let’s consider again Burge’s example of the agent, S, who 
holds either a belief about arthritis or a belief about tharthritis, depending on S’s social 
environment.  As we say in the quote above, although S would express his belief as “I have 
arthritis in the thigh,” no matter which context S is in, if S is in the actual world his belief 
will have the content (1) I have arthritis in the thigh, and if he is in the counterfactual world 
it will have the content (2) I have tharthritis in the thigh.  By stipulation, S is not in a position 
to know whether the content of his belief is (1) or (2); he cannot determine which of the 
relevant alternatives holds in his case.  Boghossian puts the point in this way: 
    …S has to be able to exclude the possibility that his thought involved the concept 
arthritis rather than the concept tharthritis, before he can be said to know what his 
thought is.  But this means that he has to reason his way to a conclusion about his 
thought; and reason to it, moreover, from evidence about his external environment 
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which, by assumption, he does not possess.  How, then, can he know his thought at all? 
–much less know it directly?” (1989, p14, italics mine)    
 
 S would need to reason to the conclusion that his environment is such that the content of 
his thought involves arthritis rather than tharthritis.  But he could not know the relevant facts 
about his environment “by mere introspection.  It would seem to follow, therefore, that I 
could not know the contents of my thoughts purely observationally: I would have to infer 
what I think from facts about my environment” (1989, p12).  By introspection alone S cannot 
know whether the content of this thought involves arthritis or tharthritis, and if he cannot 
make this discrimination Boghossian claims S cannot know what he thinks.2    
 Addressing the point of whether arthritis and tharthritis are relevant alternatives, 
Boghossian draws on an analogy.  “Someone may not be aware that there is a lot of 
counterfeit money in his vicinity; but if there is, the hypothesis that the dime-looking object 
in his hand is counterfeit needs to be excluded before he can be said to know that it is a 
dime” (1989, p14).   If S has been switching back and forth between worlds in which the 
concepts arthritis and tharthritis are expressed by the term ‘arthritis’, then he is in an 
analogous situation as the agent who is in the presence of counterfeit coins, and whether S 
knows about his situation or not does not alter what the relevant alternatives are.  “Epistemic 
relevance is not a subjective concept” (1989, p14), and through introspection S cannot 
discriminate between these relevant alternatives, therefore he cannot know the content of his 
own thoughts via introspection.  Mental content externalism seems to leave introspection as 
an inadequate mode of gaining self-knowledge.    
 
                                                 
2 There seems to be something that S knows; he knows that he has some thought, Φ, which he would express as 
“I have arthritis in my thigh”.  This would not seem to satisfy Boghossian, since S would not know the content 
of Φ, but this smaller piece of knowledge will play a major role in justification later in the paper.   
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 Mental Content Externalism and Self-Knowledge with No Basis 
 
 So much, claims Boghossian, for introspective access to the content of our thoughts.  
Boghossian takes up a debate directly with Burge (1988) when he expresses the difficulties 
for the view that we can know our thoughts directly, through no faculty or process at all.  
Burge claims that our self-knowledge is not a matter of taking our thoughts merely as objects 
of other mental states.  “When one knows that one is thinking that p, one is not taking one’s 
thought (or thinking) that p merely as an object.  One is thinking that p in the very event of 
thinking knowledgeably that one is thinking it” (1988, p654).  Thinking knowledgeably that 
one is thinking that p, in Burge’s terms, is to have a second order mental state that judges 
one’s self to be thinking that p.  It is to have a though such as I judge: I am thinking that p.  
Burge’s position is that we know our thoughts “to be what [they are] by thinking [them] 
while exercising second order, self-ascriptive powers” (1988, p656), in our second order 
thoughts.  In this way we can know our own thoughts without appealing to an activity such 
as introspection in order to gain knowledge of them.  He writes,  
    …perceptual knowledge of physical objects does not presuppose that one has first 
checked to insure that the background enabling conditions are fulfilled.  The same 
point applies to knowledge of one’s own mental events, particularly knowledge of the 
sort that interested Descartes.  Such knowledge consists in a reflexive judgment which 
involves thinking a first-order thought that the judgment is itself about.  The reflexive 
judgment simply inherits the content of the first-order thought. (1988, p656) 
 
 Burge uses the example of thinking that writing requires concentration.  This is a first order 
thought, and to know that I am thinking this thought I need merely to have a second order 
thought that judges that I am thinking that writing requires concentration.  The content of the 
first order thought is inherited by the second order thought, and therefore the second order 
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thought- I judge: I am thinking  that writing requires concentration- is self verifying.  It is 
not possible that my judgment could be wrong, since the thought about which the judgment 
is made is contained within that thought itself.  Whatever the content of the first order 
thought may be, it is contained in the second order thought that both subsumes the first order 
thought and takes the first order thought as its object.     
 So on Burge’s picture, whenever I am having a thought I can always make a veridical 
judgment that I am having that thought, and thereby know what thought I am having.  My 
knowledge of my thoughts consists in my second order judgments about those thoughts, and 
not in a faculty of introspection I can exercise to observe what thoughts I am having.  My 
self-knowledge depends solely on my having certain sorts of thoughts, second order self-
verifying thoughts, and not on a process by which I observe my thoughts.   
 Boghossian raises several objections to Burge’s position.  The first is that Burge’s theory 
does not seem to cover our “standing mental states” (1989, p21).  We might make judgments 
concerning our beliefs, desires, fears, etc., but these judgments do not seem to be self-
verifying.   
    For example, [the thoughts] -I judge: I believe that writing requires concentration- or 
-I judge: I desire that writing require concentration- are not self verifying.  I need not 
actually believe that writing requires concentration in order to think the first thought, 
nor actually desire that it require concentration to think the second. (1989, p21)      
 
 Thought this is no doubt correct, if we change the attitude of the thought it will fit Burge’s 
theory.  If I have the second order thought  --I judge: I think that I believe writing requires 
concentration-- this thought does conform to Burge’s picture.  Boghossian makes the same 
objection regarding occurrently fearing that something is the case; 
    Self-regarding judgments about what I occurrently desire or fear, for example, are 
manifestly not self-verifying, in that I need not actually desire or fear any particular 
thing in order to judge that I do.  Thus it may be that –I judge: I fear that writing 
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requires concentration—without actually fearing that it does.  The judgment is not self-
verifying. (1989, p21)  
 
 Again, Boghossian is correct.  I may judge that I fear writing requires concentration 
without actually having this fear.  I may be mistaken about my fear.  But I cannot judge that I 
think that I fear that writing requires concentration without thinking that I fear that writing 
requires concentration.  Although Boghossian states clearly that we take ourselves to “know 
about our beliefs and desires in a direct and authoritative manner” (1989, p21), our authority 
on our beliefs and desires has been in doubt since at least Freud’s theories of psychology and 
the acknowledgement of unconscious fears, desires, expectations, etc.  The reason that I may 
be mistaken about my fear is that fearing may not be the sort of mental state to which I have 
authoritative, first-person access.  As Burge points out, “much of our self knowledge is 
similar to the knowledge of other’s mental events.  It depends on observations of our own 
behavior…  And there is much that we do not know, or even misconstrue, about our own 
minds” (1988, p649).  Boghossian’s therapist may be in as good a position, or a better 
position, than Boghossian himself to know the nature of his fears.  This does not impugn the 
special character of some of our self-knowledge: that we can know it authoritatively from our 
first-person perspective. 
 Boghossian claims that Burge’s picture, at best, only guarantees knowledge of our thoughts 
that are “absolutely coincident” (1989, p21) with our second-order thoughts about them. “In 
other words, the second-order judgment will be self-verifying only if it literally incorporates 
the very thought about which it is a judgment” (1989, p21).  Though Boghossian takes this to 
be a criticism of Burge’s view, it is in fact precisely what Burge had in mind.  Burge 
explicitly states that “the special epistemic status of these cases depends on the judgments’ 
being made simultaneously from and about one’s first-person point of view.  The point of 
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view and time of the judgment must be the same as that of the thought being judged to 
occur” (1988, p658).  
 Burge’s account guarantees that we can know our thoughts as they occur, and what makes 
my thoughts knowable is that at any time they occur I can judge that I am thinking them.  
This does not guarantee my knowledge of my deepest fears and desires, but no account of 
self knowledge in the offing claims to provide me with authority on these matters.  It also 
does not guarantee knowledge of thoughts that have just occurred but are not longer 
occurring.  But this is not a problem for a theory of self knowledge so much as it is for a 
theory of memory and its accuracy.   
 Burge’s account gives us knowledge of our occurrent thoughts, insofar as we can 
simultaneously judge ourselves to be having those thoughts.  He saves for us some sort of 
self-knowledge, but cannot give us complete knowledge of our mental states from the first-
person perspective; though we have knowledge of our thoughts to some extent, our first 
person perspective cannot give us access to the wide content of these thoughts.  We cannot 
individuate between the content of our mental states and the relevant alternatives to that 
content from within our first-person perspective.  Burge, however, considers this to be 
irrelevant to our claim to know our own thoughts.  We must come up with an interpretation, 
then, of what we know, if we cannot know the wide content of our thoughts. 
 Let’s go back, once again, to Burge’s example of the agent, S, who thinks he has arthritis 
in his thigh.  Burge claims that S knows that he thinks he has arthritis in this thigh- he judges 
himself to have this first-order thought in a second-order, self-verifying thought.  But what is 
it that S knows when he knows that he thinks that he has arthritis?  We said above (in 
discussing Boghossian) that S cannot know the (entire) content of this thought, since his 
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thought may be about arthritis or tharthritis, depending on S’s social environment.  But there 
is something that S knows no matter what social environment S is in, in virtue of S having 
the appropriate second-order thought.     
 Let us call S’s thought Σ, and the content of S’s thought, including both wide and narrow 
content, Φ.3  Since Φ depends on the relation S bears to his environment, S cannot know Φ 
except through empirical investigation.  Φ may involve arthritis, or Φ may involve 
tharthritis; the nature of Φ is unavailable to S as the thought experiment stands.  No matter 
whether Φ involves arthritis or tharthritis, S will express his thought (the content of which is 
Φ) as “I have arthritis in my thigh”.  Call the manner in which S would express this thought 
“Ψ”.  Ψ is what S knows in virtue of being able to have the second-order thought --I judge 
that I think that I have arthritis in my thigh--.  S knows how he would express this thought, 
the thought that has the content Φ, and he would express this thought as “I have arthritis in 
my thigh”, no matter whether he is in the actual or counterfactual social environment.   
 On my picture, the knowledge of S’s thought, Σ, that Burge’s account guarantees for S is 
Ψ, how S would express Σ, and not the content, Φ, of Σ.4      
 In other words, I can know that I have some thought Σ, and how I would Ψ this thought, 
that is, I would express it as “I have arthritis in my thigh”.  The content of Σ is Φ, which is 
not wholly available to me.  Boghossian would not be satisfied with this sort of self-
knowledge; when he asks, “how could anyone be in a position to know his thoughts merely 
by observing them, if facts about their content are determined by their relational properties?” 
                                                 
3 Many philosophers would likely identify the content of a thought with the thought.  I would prefer not to be 
committed to this identity, although for the purposes of this paper I doubt that it will make a difference either 
way. 
4 I intend Ψ to include not only the precise way in which S has or will express Σ, but also its grammatical 
transformations (excluding the substitution of coreferential terms, in cases where the subject does not know that 
these terms are coreferential).   
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(Boghossian, 11), he is clearly concerned with how one could be in the position to know the 
content, Φ, of his thoughts, and not how one would be in the position to know the manner in 
which one would express that thought.  Burge, however, does not seem to share 
Boghossian’s concern, and focuses on an agent’s knowledge of his thoughts, rather than 
specifically the content of his thoughts.  We might treat this as a mere terminological 
difference, but I think this would be a mistake and that the interpretation I propose accounts 
better for the difference between Boghossian’s and Burge’s positions on self-knowledge. 
 Burge certainly would not claim that we have first-person authority concerning the nature 
of Φ, the contents of our thoughts in their entirety.  He writes, “One clearly does not have 
first-person authority about whether one of one’s thoughts is to be explicated or individuated 
in such and such a way” (1988, p662).  But one need not, on Burge’s account, know Φ in 
order to know what one thinks.  “Thus, I can know that I have arthritis, and know I think I 
have arthritis, even though I do not have a proper criterion for what arthritis is” (1988, p662).  
In whatever situation S is in, he can think, I have arthritis.  But what S’s thought has in 
common in both the counterfactual and actual situations is Ψ; the way in which S will 
express his thought in either situation is “I have arthritis”.  The content Φ of S’s thought in 
the counterfactual and actual cases is completely different.  As Burge says in “Individualism 
and the Mental”,   
    In the counterfactual situation, the patient lacks some, probably all, of the attitudes 
commonly attributed with content-clauses containing “arthritis” in oblique [opaque] 
occurrences.  He lacks the occurrent thoughts or beliefs that he has arthritis in the 
thigh, that he has had arthritis for years…  We suppose that in [this] case we cannot 
correctly ascribe any content-clause containing an oblique [or, opaque] occurrence of 
the term “arthritis”. (1979, p600). 
 
 I take these considerations to support the interpretation I propose, that on Burge’s account 
we know not the content, Φ, of our thoughts, since this includes both wide and narrow 
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content in some cases, but how we would Ψ those thoughts.  I know that I have a thought, Σ, 
and the relation that I bare to the content of that thought, Φ, is Ψ, knowing the manner in 
which I would express Σ.  The question for us to address now is whether this limited self 
knowledge, knowledge of Ψ, is sufficient for us to know how our thoughts relate to each 







V  How Limited Self Knowledge Threatens Accessibilism 
 
 
 We arrived at the conclusion above, that given the restrictions on self knowledge imposed 
by mental content externalism, S can know that he has a thought, and although he may not 
know the content, Φ, of that thought precisely, he can be related to that content in such a way 
that he knows the manner in which he would express, Ψ, that thought.  This may be a 
problem for a stronger internalist view than Mentalism, or one stronger than any view which 
merely holds that justification supervenes on an agent’s mental states, without specifying 
how that supervenience affects the agent’s first-person relation to factors that justify their 
beliefs.  One might hold that an agent needs access to the content, Φ, of her thoughts, and if 
this is the case accessibilist theories would not be viable in light of the restrictions mental 
content externalism impose on self-knowledge.     
 The accessibilist theory that Conee and Feldman describe they label (unsurprisingly) 
“Accessibilism”, the view that “the epistemic justification of a person’s belief is determined 
by things to which the person has some special sort of access” (2001, p233).  If the factors 
that justify our beliefs are only factors to which we have access via our first-personal 
relations to our mental states, then the restrictions that mental content externalism put on our 
relation to the content of our beliefs might undermine an accessibilist view.  Perhaps we must 
know the entirety of the content, Φ, of our mental state to see what relation that mental state 
bares to another.  The restriction of an agent’s knowledge to only the manner in which he 
 
would express his mental state, Ψ, instead of encompassing the entire content, Φ, on this 
interpretation would keep him from having access to the relations between his mental states.  
This, of course, would put the factors relevant to justification beyond the scope of the agent’s 
first person perspective, and thereby undermine the general accessibilist position, that the 
factors relevant to the justification of an agent’s belief are factors to which an agent has 
access.        
 I propose that although mental content externalism seems to threaten Accessibilism, this is 
only a prima facie threat.  My suggestion is that knowing how one would Ψ ones thought Σ, 
even though one does not have access to the content Φ of Σ, will give an agent knowledge of 
the justificatory relations between Σ and other of his thoughts.  Granted, knowledge of this 
relation is not knowledge of the entire way in which one’s thoughts are related- an 
omniscient being would have more thorough knowledge of the relations between his 
thoughts than our agent S does.  My proposal is that S’s knowledge of the Ψ of his thought Σ 
provides S with access to the relations between his thought Σ and his other thoughts (Σ1…Σn) 
such that he will know whether Σ is justified by Σ1…Σn.  The relations between the Ψ’s of 
Σ’s, not the Φ’s of Σ’s, are the factors relevant to the justification of Σ.  Even under the 
restrictions that mental content externalism could put on self knowledge, I believe that 
Accessibilism will still satisfy the desiderata laid out at the beginning of this paper. 
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How Real is the Threat? 
 
 Bonjour senses an incompatibility between mental content externalism and justification 
internalism when he writes,  
    “…if part or all of the content of a belief is inaccessible to the believer, then both the 
justifying status of other beliefs in relation to that content and the status of that content 
as justifying further beliefs will be similarly inaccessible, thus contravening the 
internalist requirement for justification.”  (1992, p136) 
 
 James Chase (2001) addresses the worry that Bonjour expresses here and defends the 
compatibility of mental content externalism and justification internalism.  He holds that there 
is an equivocation at play in the use of “inacessible” in the statement above.  We might view 
BonJour’s claim in a similar way.  On our account of the limitation that mental content 
externalism puts on self-knowledge, we would treat BonJour’s statement as not 
distinguishing between the agent’s knowledge of the Ψ of that belief and the content, Φ, of 
that belief.  In cases in which a belief involves a wide content concept, an agent will not 
know the Φ of that belief, and therefore does not have the same thorough knowledge of the 
relations between his mental states that an omniscient agent would have.  But the agent does 
have access to the Ψ of each of his beliefs, and to the relations between the Ψ’s of his beliefs.           
 Chase precisifies Bonjour’s claim in the following way; 
B1) If Content Externalism is true then there can be an agent A with belief B such that 
part or all of the content of B is not internally available to A. 
B2) If an agent A with belief B is such that part or all of the content of B is not 
internally available to A, then the justification relations B stands in with other beliefs 
of A’s are not internally available to A. 
B3) If agent A with belief B is such that the justification relations B stands in with 
other beliefs of A are not internally available to A, then not all factors relevant to the 
justificaiton of beliefs of A are internally available to A. 
C’’) If Content Externalism is true then Justification Internalism is false. (2001, p237) 
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 The equivocation, as Chase spells out Bonjour’s argument, is in the notion of internal 
availability.  In B1, clearly, what is not internally available to agent A is part (or all) of the 
content, Φ, of belief B.  In B2, it is the justification relation(s) between one belief and 
another which are not internally available to the agent.  However, from the fact that part of 
the content, Φ, of A’s belief is not available to A, it does not follow that the the justification 
relations B stands in to other beliefs are entirely unavailable to A.  On my proposed account, 
the relations between the Ψ’s of Σ’s, not the Φ’s of Σ’s, are the factors that serve to justify Σ.  
So long as the Ψ’s of A’s beliefs are available to A, the justification relations in which B 
stands to other beliefs will be available to A as well.   
 It would be an error to assume that the internalist would take the relations between the Φ’s 
of Σ’s as the justificatory relations between Σ’s.  I propose that internalists have always been 
committed to the view that only the relations between the Ψ’s of beliefs are relevant to the 
justification of a belief; although they have not thus far explicitly distinguished between 
content Φ and the corresponding Ψ of the thought with content Φ.  
 Consider the case of S and S*.  In taking S and S* to be equally justified in their beliefs, 
internalists are treating the relations between the Ψ’s of Σ’s as the justificatory relation 
between the Σ’s of S and S*:  it is the Ψ of Σ that S and S* share in common.  To put the 
point more strongly, and I think accurately, the Ψ’s of S’s and S*’s Σ’s are identical, and thus 
the justificatory status of S’s and S*’s Σ’s are identical as well.  Internalists hold that the 
envatted and unenvatted agents, with identical internal/psychological histories, to be justified 
to the same extent and in the same way in their beliefs, Σ, if those beliefs have the same Ψ.   
 We need not treat S and S* as holding the same belief; clearly, given the difference in the 
content (Φ and Φ*) of Σ and Σ*, there is at least some difference between their beliefs.  But 
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on this view it does not matter whether Σ and Σ* are the same belief of different beliefs.  We 
have distinguished between the Φ of a thought and the Ψ of that thought, and thus we can 
identify what it is that Σ and Σ* share in common- their Ψ’s.            
 Although taking into account the restrictions that mental content externalism places on 
self-knowledge requires that the internalist rearticulate the factors that are relevant to the 
justification of a belief in order disambiguate between Φ and Ψ, this rearticulation is only the 
clarification of an ambiguity; I believe it is not a significant modification of the internalist 
position.       
 Chase’s response to the problem that BonJour identifies employs a Brain-in-a-Vat thought 
experiment.  This response to Bonjour, as one would expect, compares the response a 
justification internalist would give to the problem of mental content externalim to other cases 
in which external factors relevant to an agent’s belief are unavailable to that agent.  
According to the internalist position, the justification of the envatted agent’s beliefs depends 
neither on how those beliefs match up to the world (their truth or falsity) nor on the wide 
content of the agent’s beliefs.  The elements of an agent’s mental state that are relevant to the 
justification of an agent’s beliefs are those that are shared between the envatted and 
unenvatted agent.  Though I believe Chase’s response to be a successful reply to BonJour’s 
proposed problem, it does not articulate what element of an agent’s belief is held constant 
between contexts in which he is a brain in a vat and when he is in the ordinary world, except 
to state that it is the element of the agent’s thought to which the agent has access.  The 
problem with Chase’s answer to Bonjour is not that it is inaccurate, but that it is vague.   
 Burge’s example of the patient who has beliefs about arthritis and to what ailments the 
term “arthritis” applies is more unique to the issue of mental content externalism.  We 
 26
stipulated that S and S* are identical in their histories, physical constitution, dispositions to 
behave, etc, and differ only in their social environments.  And we drew the conclusion that 
S’s belief expressed as “I have arthritis in the thigh” and S*’s belief also expressed as “I have 
arthritis in the thigh” have different content, Φ, although there is nothing within the agents 
themselves (the internal properties of the agents) that accounts for this difference in Φ.  The 
Φ of S’s belief involves arthritis, while the Φ of S*’s belief cannot involve arthritis since 
there is no term that means arthritis in his linguistic community.  Instead, the content Φ of 
S*’s belief involves tharthritis.   
 How does this affect the justificatory status of S’s and S*’s beliefs?  As internalists, to 
determine if either of these beliefs are justified we would look to the relations that these 
beliefs bare to additional beliefs or other justifying factors that are internal to the agent.  As 
we set up the example above, S came about his belief through causal reading, conversation, 
etc., in the way that most lay people arrive at their beliefs about medical conditions.  S 
believes that the materials he has read are good sources for gathering information on medical 
conditions, he believes that the people with whom he has spoken about arthritis are 
intelligent and fairly well informed, he believes that he has read these materials and heard 
these people correctly, etc.  It is the similarity in the histories listed above that accounts for 
the fact that S and S* would both Ψ their beliefs (with different Φ’s) as “I have arthritis in 
my thigh”.  That S and S* would Ψ their beliefs in the same way is not coincidental: the Ψ 
derrives from S’s and S*’s identical histories.  Furthermore, were the histories of S and S* 
not identical, we would not be concerned with whether their Σ’s were both justified in the 
same way and to the same extent. 
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 How do S and S* come to know the way in which their beliefs Σ and Σ* are related to their 
other beliefs?  S and S* will have certain additional beliefs, which were grounded in related 
experiences in the world (readings, discussions with intelligent friends, etc.) which would 
each be Ψ’d in its own way.  The Ψ of each belief will be related to the Ψ’s of other beliefs, 
as the Φ of a belief would be related to the Φ of another belief.  And the Ψ of a belief, Σ, will 
be related to the Φ of Σ such that the Ψ of Σ will not vary unless the Φ of Σ varies as well.  S 
and S* both understand something about arthritis and tharthritis, or we would have no 
reason to attribute to them thoughts with Φ’s that involve arthritis and tharthritis 
respectively.    As Burge notes, “It is a truism that to think one’s thoughts, and thus to think 
cogito-like thoughts, one must understand what one is thinking well enough to think it” 
(1979, p662).  S and S* will both have some understanding of Φ.  They will share their 
understanding of the Φ of their thoughts in common, which explains why they will Ψ their 
Σ’s identically, as “I have arthritis in my thigh”.      These Ψ’s do not arise in the speaker at 
random, but rather from the histories of S and S*, histories that S and S* share in common, 
barring the subtle differences in their environments.  These histories both explain the 
acquisition of their thoughts Σ and Σ* with contents Φ and Φ*, and why S and S* will Ψ Σ 
and Σ* identically.       
 So the Ψ of an agent’s thought will correspond to the content Φ of that thought in a 
systematic way produced by the histories that agents like S and S* share in common.    Other 
of the agent’s thoughts with their unique Ψ’s that also correspond to their contents Φ in 
systematic ways will be related to each other not merely by their contents Φ (which are 
relations to which an omniscient agent would have access) but their Ψ’s as well.  The agent 
will have access to the Ψ’s of his thoughts, and will thereby have access to these relations 
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between the Ψ’s of his thoughts.  It is the Ψ’s of thoughts that agents in thought experiments 
such as Putnam’s Twin Earth share in common across worlds, and it is the Ψ’s of thoughts 
that are held constant between situations in which an agent is envatted and when that agent is 
in the actual world.  Internalists have always maintained that it is what the agents’ mental 
states share in common in these thought experiments that is relevant to the justification of 
these agents’ beliefs.  The properties that otherwise identical envatted and unenvatted agents 
share are the properties that factor into the justification of an agent’s beliefs.  Now we see 
both what that the agent’s mental states share in common, their Ψ’s, and how these Ψ’s can 
be related to each other in such a way that the agent has sufficient knowledge of the relations 
between his beliefs to justify those beliefs. 
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